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Abstract Cameroon has recorded disasters, both natural
and man-made, in the past. The coastal city of Limbe and
many other geographical locations are potential sites for
future disasters. On the basis of interviews and related
primary and secondary literature, this article looks at past
occurrences of floods in Limbe, particularly those of 2001,
and how the state and local authorities managed the chal-
lenge. Through this, it attempts an evaluation of state
policies and the institutional structure for disaster risk
reduction (DRR) and management in the country. The
study reveals that Cameroon does not have a national
disaster management structure and a national platform for
DRR. Disaster related activities are lumped together with
other civil protection responsibilities of the Ministry of
Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MIN-
ATD) despite the country’s commitment to the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005–2015. Government interven-
tions are more reactive than proactive although its strategy
to disaster management indicates both disaster prepared-
ness and emergency intervention and rehabilitation. The
study concludes that the present strategy is bureaucratic,
financially burdensome, and does not really achieve the
essential goals of DRR in saving lives and reducing vul-
nerability. For DRR to be effective in Cameroon, a per-
manent disaster management unit with regional and local
structures should be put in place independent of other
branches of the Department of Disaster and Emergency
Services of MINATD and with each level exercising a
significant degree of operative autonomy. A national policy
and framework with emphasis on DRR should be adopted
in the country.
Keywords Cameroon  Disaster risk
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1 Introduction
A disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society involving widespread human,
material, economic, or environmental losses and impacts
that exceed the ability of the affected community to cope
using its own resources (Wisner et al. 2004; Birkman 2006;
UNISDR 2009; Coppola 2011). The number and seriousness
of disasters in terms of people affected and property lost have
been on the increase around the world since the 1960s when
reliable data started to be recorded (DFID 2006). Between
2000 and 2012, disasters killed 1.2 million people and
affected an annual average of 268 million people. Disasters
also caused damages worth USD 1.7 trillion between 2002
and 2012 (Guha-Sapir et al. 2013; UNISDR 2013).
Preparedness and relief activities have often shown the
extent of the effects of disasters. That is why local,
regional, national, and international organizations have
often been on the alert, ensuring that effective and well
prepared disaster management plans are made available in
vulnerable areas for prevention, preparedness, rapid and
effective relief, and recovery. Cameroon has experienced a
number of natural and man-made disasters over the years
and the approach to solving the crises by bringing relief to
the affected population has left many people uncertain of
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the availability and approach to disaster management in the
country. A paucity of research literature on disaster man-
agement in Cameroon adds to the problem. An in-depth
study of the history of disasters and disaster management in
Cameroon has become imperative. The aim of this study is
to contribute to the historiography of disaster management
in Cameroon and to create awareness of the necessity to
regularly question and assess policies and actions in man-
aging disasters.
2 Study Area
Cameroon is a democratic republic with a surface area of
475,000 km2. Recent estimates (2012) put the population at
about 22 million people (African Development Bank
2013). Although the estimates indicate a moderate popu-
lation density of 46 people per km2, the rural–urban pop-
ulation divide shows that 59.9 % of the population lives in
urban areas while 40.1 % lives in rural areas (UNISDR-
Africa 2010). The population density is thus uneven and
particularly intense in the urban areas. This exacerbates the
quest for basic services such water, electricity, and other
social amenities like appropriate housing, invariably lead-
ing to the development of slums and ghettos thereby
increasing vulnerability to disasters. It is estimated that
between 70 % and 80 % of the urban population lives in
slums with access to portable water limited to only 37.5 %
(Nussbaum 2010). This situation is made even worse by the
fact that almost a half of the country’s population lives
below the poverty line and unemployment currently stands
at 30 % (CIA World Factbook 2013). The lack of money
and the need to sustain livelihood by any means ultimately
lead to the lack of a culture of safety and disaster pre-
vention among this portion of the population.
In 2012, the country’s annual growth rate was 4.1 % and
the GDP per capita stood at USD 2,400. The national
budget balance grew in deficit from 2.7 % in 2011 to 3.5 %
in 2012 of the GDP and inflation stood above 3 % (African
Development Bank 2013). All these in addition to the fact
that the country over the past 10 years has featured
prominently amongst the most corrupt nations in the world
(Transparency International 2013) emphasize the difficulty
on the part of the government and other local stakeholders
of finding resources for disaster management and putting
them into effective use.
Cameroon is divided into 10 administrative regions—
two (the North-West and South-West) are part of the for-
mer British administered territory of Southern Cameroons
and the eight others are part of the former French admin-
istered territory of Cameroun. The country can also be
divided into a Christian south and Muslim north, and for-
ested south and savanna north. There are more than 260
ethnic groups, each speaking a different dialect (Neba
1990). The country has abundant natural resources ranging
from fertile soils for agriculture, oil and gas, minerals such
as gold, bauxite, and tin, to timber and other non-timber
forest products. Since the 1990s, due to the extraction of oil
off the coast of Limbe in the Gulf of Guinea, the country’s
economic emphasis to some extent has shifted from agri-
culture to the extraction of oil and gas but revenues from
the exploitation of these resources, and from oil in partic-
ular, have not been sufficiently channelled into structural
investments in infrastructure and the productive sectors
(African Development Bank 2013).
The city of Limbe is located along the coastal area of
Fako Division, South-West Region of Cameroon (Fig. 1).
The indigenous people include the Bakweri, Isubu, and
Creoles (Matute 1988). It has beautiful coastal beaches,
historic monuments, a botanic garden, and a wildlife cen-
ter. It is not only an international tourist destination but the
major petroleum and agricultural hub of Cameroon. The
lone oil refinery is located in Limbe and the Cameroon
Development Corporation’s (CDC) banana, palm, and
rubber plantations are spread over a majority of the most
favorable lands for settlement around the city. The Cor-
poration also has its headquarters in Limbe. The city’s
economic importance therefore cannot be overemphasized
and this continues to account for the high influx of eco-
nomic migrants who then exert pressure on the city’s
already scarce natural and man-made resources. With a
surface area of 545 km2, and a population currently esti-
mated at 120,000 inhabitants (Mosoke 2012), Limbe has
one of the highest population densities in Cameroon with
220 people per km2.
The city is characterized by a low-lying coastal plain,
rising to a chain of horseshoe shaped hills with slopes of
Fig. 1 Geographic location of Limbe in Cameroon. Adapted from
Kometa (2012)
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varying intensities towards the northeast and east, with the
highest points reaching 362 m above sea level (Njabe and
Fobang 2006). The area exhibits the characteristics of the
Gulf of Guinea tropical equatorial climate of hot, moist,
and dry conditions (Folack and Gana 2003). Only about 10
miles from Dibuncha, the second wettest place in the world
after Cherrapunji in India (UNU-EHS and UFS-DiMTEC
2010), Limbe experiences very heavy torrential rains in the
long rainy season (March–October) with the highest aver-
age monthly precipitation of about 700 mm recorded in
June, July, and August (Neba 1990).
A drive through the city indicates an acute spatial dis-
organization with a mixture of planned and unplanned
settlements, which are a reflection of a relative scarcity of
suitable land for settlement as a result of rapid population
growth and a lack of any effective land use development
plan. This is because, possibilities of expansion are limited
by the hilly nature of the eastern side, the Atlantic ocean to
the south, the Mt. Cameroon lava flow route to the west,
and the plantations of the CDC to the north. The imminent
construction of a deep seaport facility and a naval shipyard
has not only exacerbated population influx but has further
intensified land speculation. Within the city small streams
flow into larger drainage beds that converge into two main
rivers (Limbe and Jenguele) that empty into the Atlantic
Ocean (Fig. 2). These rivers frequently overflow their
banks in the rainy season causing floods in the low-lying
areas that are just 1–2 m above sea level. These are ideally
the best parts for settlement but unfortunately there are no
properly conceived drainage channels throughout the city.
The situation is aggravated by settlement very close to the
coastline at sea level with very poorly constructed, mostly
wooden buildings. The hills that surround the city are made
up of loose ferralitic and volcanic soils that easily disin-
tegrate when they absorb a lot of water (Nwankiti 1983).
Poverty affects over 85 % of the Limbe population
(Awum et al. 2001). That is why over 70 % of the popu-
lation of Limbe lives in make-shift temporal structures
constructed on floodplains, too close to the coastline, or on
the hillslopes (areas declared as not suitable for habitation)
and under slum-like conditions—a situation of high vul-
nerability to disaster (Mosoke 2012). The intense seismic
activity from Mt. Cameroon located in the nearby Buea
Subdivision and the threat of lava flows into the city have
made matters worse. The last eruption of Mt. Cameroon in
1999 emitted hot magma that burnt down a large section of
a palm plantation and the closest magma solidified just a
few kilometers from the city. All these, make Limbe a city
highly vulnerable to disasters.
3 Methodology
This study is qualitative and makes use of a blend of rel-
evant historical inquiry and social science data gathering
tools and presentation approaches. The researchers have
relied heavily on oral accounts of hazard related experi-
ences and data from primary and secondary written sour-
ces. Interviews were conducted in the neighborhoods
affected by floods and landslides between February and
June 2012, with affected persons and other eyewitnesses as
well as some staff of the Limbe City Council, social
Fig. 2 High flood risk areas in Limbe, Cameroon. Adapted from Kometa (2012)
Int J Disaster Risk Sci 149
123
workers, and some members of the 2001 Local Crisis
Commission for the 2001 flood and landslide disasters in
Limbe. A total of 50 participants were interviewed by
convenience sampling on a one-to-one, non-directive basis
(Maree 2009). The data were analyzed by grouping the
responses into thematic areas and presented in a narrative
format.
Archival data from committee reports and legislations
on disasters were obtained from the National Archives in
Buea (NAB), National Archives in Yaounde´ (NAY), the
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization
(MINATD), and the Limbe City (former Urban) Council
(LCC). These materials gave the researchers a view of the
past and present policies on disasters in the country. Pub-
lished books and internet sources provided us with general,
theoretical, and conceptual knowledge of the field of study.
For a first-hand impression of the floods, landslides, and
drainage situation in the city during the rainy season and to
enable us corroborate the oral and written data, we also
carried out field observations in the city in June, July, and
August 2013. We recognize, however, that major sources
of error for research reporting could arise from the
authentication of sources and from the subjective bias of
the authors. We therefore ensured that all respondents
confirmed their statements by sending them feedback from
the interviews before using them in the study. To enhance
objective research reporting a wide variety of informants
and documents were consulted.
The hypothesis is that the Cameroon government has not
set up an efficient disaster risk reduction (DRR) framework
and that current strategies are very inefficient. The objec-
tives are to analyze the government’s handling of con-
temporary flood and landslide situations in Limbe; to show
the inefficiency of the current strategies; and to highlight
the need for a reconsideration of government strategies
with the ultimate goal of establishing an efficient proactive
national DRR framework that is completely autonomous
from the current reactive civil protection structures of the
MINATD.
4 Contemporary Flood Disaster Events in Limbe
and the Government’s Response
Despite the awareness that some of the low-lying areas in
Limbe are not habitable, many people in the last two
decades have adopted a resigned attitude toward this and
also have encroached on the steep hillslopes known for
their catastrophic landslides (Mosoke 2012). The conse-
quences have often been grievous. Each year, between the
months of June and August, often characterized by week-
long torrential rains, the city is submerged in water, above
a meter deep in some quarters, causing serious distress to
the local population and great embarrassment to the
municipal authorities and local government officials. Res-
idents on the slopes find the hills collapsing on their
houses. According to statistics, each year about 100 homes
are flooded and an average of five landslides occurs in the
city (Lyonga 2012). In some years the situation became so
critical that it required national emergency alerts—such as
in 1990, 2000, 2001, and 2007. Emphasis in this analysis is
on the 2001 disaster because of its devastating nature and
the fact that it received significant government attention
from which state disaster management strategies could best
be appreciated.
On 26 and 27 June 2001 the city was engulfed in heavy
rains that led to a combination of floods and landslides and
resulted in more than 30 landslide scars, several tensional
cracks (Lambi et al. 2002), 154 completely destroyed
houses, and rendered over 233 people homeless. About 93
people died and over 197 cases were reported for post-
disaster related illnesses and wounds of which 82 were
reported at the Limbe District Hospital alone (Andin 2012).
A significant number of livestock was lost and many
people were rendered permanently or partially unem-
ployed. The floods and landslides took a great toll on
community infrastructure such as roads, water and elec-
tricity supply lines, communication systems, schools, hos-
pitals, and churches, which were either completely or
partially shattered. All losses were estimated at about three
million US dollars (Limbe Urban Council 2001). A com-
parative summary of the damages caused by floods and
related landslides in Limbe since 1990 is presented in
Table 1.
When disasters occur as they have in Limbe, it is
expected that relief and rehabilitation would be swift. In
2001, the Senior Divisional Officer for Fako Division
through the Governor of the South-West Region informed
the various administrative levels of the situation as policy
demanded. Through Prefectoral Order No. 94/2001 of 27
June 2001, the Senior Divisional Officer set up a crisis
Table 1 Impact of floods and landslides in Limbe, Cameroon
Item 1990 2000 2001 2007 Total
Displaced households 32 79 233 63 407
Deaths (human) 10 14 93 12 129
Reported health cases 19 20 197 62 298
Buildings destroyed 16 33 154 83 286
Animals/fowls lost 206 147 835 244 1,432
People rendered unemployed 51 107 438 79 675
Roads and bridges damaged 7 5 19 4 35
Electricity/water installations
damaged
15 8 54 6 83
Limbe Urban Council (2000, 2001) and Andin (2012)
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commission that comprised of several subcommittees. The
Crisis Commission included the Delegate of Town Plan-
ning and Housing, Fako; the Divisional Delegate for
Mines, Water and Energy; a representative of the Divi-
sional Officer for Limbe; the Divisional Delegate of Public
Works; the Mount Cameroon Project1; the Limbe Botanic
Garden; the Delegate of Urban Affairs, Limbe; the Dele-
gate of Environment and Forestry; the representative of the
CDC; the local Red Cross officials; the representatives of
the Bimbia and Bonadikombo Development Councils;
Forces of Law and Order; and the Department of Geology
at the University of Buea (Limbe Urban Council 2001).
The Crisis Commission rallied a team of 725 persons, of
which 230 were volunteers from humanitarian and chari-
table organizations. Financial resources of USD 65,000
equivalent and material resources of 15 trucks, two cater-
pillars, 14 assorted vehicles, and many others began to
arrive Saker Baptist College, which was transformed into
an emergency center as the students had gone on holidays
2 days before. Relief workers began to move destitute
survivors from the affected areas to the college. Truckloads
of bags of rice, beans, potatoes, onions, vegetables, oil,
milk, meat, fish, bread, basic drugs, mattresses, clothes, bed
sheets, pillowcases, tents, coffins, and so on continued to
flow in from all directions as the affected persons were
being moved and the dead buried (Lyonga 2012). The
Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisa-
tion, who is responsible for civil protection, arrived Limbe
a few days after.
Apart from immediately assisting victims of the floods
and landslides, to prevent post-disaster crises such as the
spread of epidemics like cholera, the Crisis Commission
was expected to determine ways of rehabilitating and
reconstructing the Limbe Municipality; identify the risk
zones; define unhabitable areas; propose strategies for
drainage in the city; and make general recommendations to
minimize potential risks. After the floodwaters had rece-
ded, the Commission went around the city to identify the
affected areas and assess the level of damage in a disaster
assessment exercise. After the assessment tour they began
paying compensation to the victims and launched rehabil-
itation and resettlement works.
Damaged roads, water channels, and bridges that had
collapsed and completely cut off some neighborhoods from
the rest of the city were gradually reconstructed. Rehabil-
itation also involved the dredging and widening of the
stream channels and the construction of reinforced concrete
embankments on the streams. Tarred roads heavily
destroyed by floodwaters were also rehabilitated while
gravel was thrown on the earth roads (Lyonga 2012).These
huge financial engagements notwithstanding, the govern-
ment disbursed another USD 1.5 million to identify risk
zones and evacuate the occupants. About 150 ha of land
were provided by the Limbe Urban Council for resettle-
ment to this effect in the Bonadikombo area on the northern
outskirts of the city. By the beginning of 2002 the gov-
ernment had begun to construct low-cost houses in this
area. The last activities from the recommendations of the
2001 Crisis Commission were carried out by the Limbe
Urban Council in 2005. In collaboration with the Divi-
sional Officer of Limbe the Council began demolishing
houses and structures within the municipality built on
waterways. These structures were said to have been
obstructing the flow of rainwater causing floods during the
rainy seasons. Structures constructed on hillslopes were
also targeted (Mosoke 2012). These efforts notwithstand-
ing, the floods of 2007 with relatively serious impacts as
well came to prove to the government that there is much
more to be done in disaster management than existing relief
and rehabilitation strategies can accomplish.
5 Assessing the Legal and Institutional Frameworks
for Disaster Management in Cameroon
Until September 1986, when the Lake Nyos gas emission
disaster struck Cameroon, the country had not thought of a
disaster management policy or strategy. The magnitude of
this disaster in which 1,785 people were killed (Ayanji
2004) demonstrated to the government that it was time to
act. The government passed Law No. 86-16 of 6 December
1986 to reorganize civil protection in Cameroon (Republic
of Cameroon 1986). Despite this law, it was only after
10 years following the 1996 measles outbreak with over 53
lives lost in Wum in the northwest region not far from the
scene of the 1986 disaster and the cholera epidemic in
northern Cameroon, which began in 1992 and by 1996 had
killed over 440 people (Ayanji 2004) that the state began to
act concretely. The President of the Republic signed
Decree No. 96/054 of 12 March 1996 to determine the
composition and duties of the National Council for Civil
Protection (Republic of Cameroon 1996) and followed this
up 2 years after by Decree No. 98-31 of 9 March 1998 to
determine the organization of emergency and relief plans
(ex post disaster measures) (Republic of Cameroon 1998a);
and Law No. 98-15 of 14 July 1998 relating to establish-
ments classified as dangerous, unhealthy, or obnoxious
(Republic of Cameroon 1998b).
These, alongside Decree No. 2004/99 of 26 April 2004
to reorganize the MINATD (Republic of Cameroon 2004),
Decree No. 2004/320 of 8 December 2004 and Decree No.
2005/104 of 13 April 2005 (Bang 2013), have since been
1 An international nongovernment organization involved in research
and the preservation of forest, wildlife, and environment around the
Mt. Cameroon area that includes Limbe.
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the operating legal frameworks for civil protection under
which any disaster management effort is carried out. While
Decree No. 2004/320 made civil protection the second
most important function of MINATD, Decree No.
2005/104 transformed the Department of Civil Protection
in MINATD to the Department of Disaster and Emergency
Services (DDES) and gave it the responsibility to organize
and coordinate civil protection activities throughout the
country for natural and human induced disasters. Table 2
summarizes the structure of disaster response in Cameroon.
By virtue of this legal and institutional framework, the
President of the Republic, assisted by the National Council
for Civil Protection, defines policies of disaster risk man-
agement, and such policies are implemented by MINATD,
through the DDES (formerly the Department of Civil
Protection). This national structure is further supported by
the regional governors as well as the regional and divi-
sional services of the specialized ministries such as the
Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection and the
Ministry of Social Affairs. This structure shows a ‘‘top
down’’ approach to disaster management with the effect
that implementation is bound to be delayed by bureaucratic
and administrative bottlenecks. From the Presidency to the
ministerial departments, down to the regional governors
and delegations, and further down to the divisional officers
and divisional delegations, and ending with the local civil
and municipal administrators, subdivisional officers and
mayors, it takes a significant amount of time to have
disaster management related decisions to be made or for
relief efforts to reach the concerned.
In the event of a disaster the competent divisional/sub-
divisional civil administrator with reliable and irrefutable
information on the nature and scope of the disaster informs
the Regional Governor, who also informs the Minister of
Territorial Administration and Decentralization. S(he) also
relays the Prime Minister, who then informs the President.
Authorization then leaves the Presidency following the
same channel before the local administrative officer con-
cerned can send out an alert; initiate emergency relief
activities; mobilize the necessary human, material, and
financial resources; convene a crisis commission; and
inform the general public.
The convened crisis commission then assumes the
responsibility of coordinating public relief action; directing
relief operations; preparing rescue facilities; forwarding
relief to the disaster area; determining the assistance and
relief needs of victims; assessing the immediate and after
effects of the disaster; and managing all the human,
material, and financial resources provided for the circum-
stance by the government authorities, public, or private
international organizations and, in general, all gifts and
legacies.
From the above description and with the experience of
the 2001 Limbe floods and landslides, it can be observed
that practically, the disaster management strategy of the
Cameroon government is centered on providing post-
disaster relief and rehabilitation rather than on being pro-
active and preventive. Where the government strategy has
shown a leaning towards some disaster preparedness
efforts, they have remained theoretical than practical. For
instance although Law No. 86-16 of 1986 to reorganize
civil protection provides for the setup of a national obser-
vatory for disasters with local branches to permanently
monitor disaster-prone areas, this organ has not yet been set
up 28 years after this law was enacted. Also, in 2002, the
government set aside March 1 to be observed yearly as the
National Day for Civil Protection and for more than
10 years has observed the International Day for Disaster
Reduction on 9 October. The events on these days, contrary
to expectation, make no significant impact in terms of
disaster awareness and preparedness as they are often
characterized by speeches by government officials instead
of grassroots sensitization campaigns.
In Limbe in 2012, of the 50 people sampled for this
study, only 21 indicated that they were aware that the area
where they lived was a disaster-prone area despite their
regular experiences with floods and landslides. Forty-eight
indicated that they have never heard of a talk on Limbe as a
disaster-prone city while only seven indicated that they
have been met by a local NGO worker, municipal or
government official on a door to door sensitization cam-
paign related to disaster prevention. Five of these seven
however revealed that such an authority only came to serve
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them a demolition notice and not for any disaster risk
education. There is also an annual report on the state of
civil protection in Cameroon but the extent of its dissem-
ination to zones and people concerned remains question-
able. None of the 50 participants has ever heard, seen, or
read a portion of this document. These revelations clearly
demonstrate the lack of focus of the government strategy
towards DRR in the country despite the fact that partners
such as the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and ProVention Con-
sortium have expressed their willingness to cooperate in
this domain. In terms of national risk identification,
assessment, monitoring, and early warning, a general study
was conducted in 1999 in hazard-prone areas (UNISDR-
Africa 2010) but this study, from the level of awareness in
Limbe, either passed the people by or begs for a second
phase.
Judging from the level of casualties, material, psycho-
social, and infrastructural damages (most often irreparable)
that disasters inflict on individuals, communities, and
governments, reactive post-disaster strategies such as those
currently in place in Cameroon should be discouraged as
they do not meet the objectives of DRR of saving lives and
reducing vulnerability. The administrative bureaucracy
involved in sounding a disaster alert makes intervention
slow, stressful, and increases the level of casualties and
damages. Although the current civil protection structure
seems decentralized by involving municipalities and divi-
sional as well as subdivisional delegations of the concerned
ministries, the devolution of authority to lower adminis-
trative levels is limited in practice (Bang 2013). For
example, Law No. 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 stipulates that
municipal councils are responsible for such tasks as orga-
nizing and coordinating relief operations (Bang 2013). But
they must await authorization and approval from higher
administrative levels, the immediate one being the Senior
Divisional Officer. As the local authorities await authori-
zation to come down the chain of command, the disaster
continues to claim victims.
Experience from the Limbe disasters has demonstrated
that post-disaster activities such as compensation and
rehabilitation are hardly successfully carried out. The 2001
Local Crisis Commission was dissolved sometime in 2002
(Andin 2012) when it was not certain that it had fulfilled its
terms of reference and without a proper auditing of its
accounts. Besides, it has become very difficult to hold
commission members accountable after the commissions
have been dissolved. The Commission was made up of
civil servants, some of them novices in disaster manage-
ment and a majority must have been transferred to other
localities considering the fact that such officials hardly stay
in one station for up to 5 years. The fact that disaster field
operations are managed by the Local Crisis Commission
with lack of accountability discourages other agencies such
as municipal authorities and NGOs from investing in DRR
activities.
The finances for the implementation of the post-disaster
management system come from the calamity budgetary
head of the DDES in MINATD. This stands at USD 1
billion annually (UNISDR-Africa 2010). Often due to
bureaucracy the finances are not disbursed on time
although there is common knowledge that the first 24 h
following a disaster are critical for search and rescue
operations, which require a responsive disbursement of
funds. Apart from that, there are no standards and norms of
accountability for the use of relief resources. Where
donations are made, as they were made in Limbe, the
amounts collected are often poorly accounted for by local
commissions. In most cases they are mismanaged. The
2001 Crisis Commission and the DDES have to date not
informed the Cameroon public on the total amount of
public and private financial and material donations
received during the 2001 Limbe disaster and how they used
the funds. Many of the victims still express feelings of
disappointment with the 2001 Crisis Commission for
mismanaging disaster relief resources. The situation in
Limbe is not different from that of the 1986 Lake Nyos gas
disaster as many of the victims are still waiting compen-
sation from the government (Bang 2013). Cameroon was
ranked the sixth most corrupt country in the world by
Transparency International in 2004 and 144 out of 177 in
2013 (Transparency International 2013). The insurance
system in Cameroon is very underdeveloped as well,
implying that the government bears the brunt of rehabili-
tation and reconstructions, because private sector involve-
ment in risk transfer is limited. Moreover, the roles of
NGOs and the private sector are not indicated in the
existing legislation. This limits their involvement to relief
work when they are made part of crisis commissions.
6 The Future: From Disaster Response to Disaster Risk
Reduction
At present, the overall coordination of the disaster man-
agement system in Cameroon lies with the DDES at the
MINATD. This is the only nodal agency for disaster
management in Cameroon. The intervention strategy of the
DDES is expected to focus on three main complementary
approaches. Before disasters, it is expected to promote
disaster preparedness, prevention, and mitigation mainly
through information, awareness-raising, sensitization, and
education and other activities that would promote a culture
of safety and readiness in the community—hence the
establishment of contingency plans during the predisaster
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phase (Bang 2013). It is expected to initiate an emergency
intervention plan during the crisis phase and coordinate the
implementation of emergency response programs (sectoral
contingency plans) for efficient and effective disaster
management. Such activities include the on-the-spot
coordination of emergency responses, search and rescue
operations, and the supervision of the activities of local
crisis commission. After disasters they are charged with
performing activities relating to compensation and reha-
bilitation of affected populations, disaster and hazard risk
assessment, reconstruction through the crisis commission,
and the communication of risk zones. The approach so far
indicates a marked disregard for the first phase, which
unfortunately should be the one emphasized as it involves
DRR.
It is important to emphasize that not all disasters, par-
ticularly natural disasters, can be prevented, but the risk of
loss of life, injury, and damage to property can be mitigated
with good evacuation plans, land-use planning, environ-
mental management, and building codes or standards
(Wisner et al. 2004; DFID 2006; UNISDR 2013). Camer-
oon should therefore adopt policies designed to provide
permanent protection from disasters; any disaster-prone
area should be equipped with disaster warning mecha-
nisms; and the people need to be educated constantly on
how best to carry out livelihood activities in such places. In
January 2005, 168 governments including Cameroon
adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)
2005–2015 (UNISDR 2005), a 10-year global plan for
natural DRR. It offers vulnerable communities such as
Limbe guiding principles, priorities for action, and prac-
tical means for achieving disaster resilience.
Almost 9 years after the Hyogo Framework was adop-
ted, very few of its recommendations are being applied in
disaster-prone areas like Limbe in Cameroon. An exami-
nation of the extent of disaster preparedness in Limbe
confirms this conclusion. After the June 2001 floods and
landslides, the 2001 Local Crisis Commission identified the
alignment of 30 landslide scars around the Mabeta neigh-
borhood (Limbe Urban Council 2001). The people were
informed of this after the disaster and some left the area but
a majority has continued to live there. Since then, nothing
has been done to inform the people of the dangers inherent
in living around this area. Tremors from nearby and active
Mt. Cameroon volcano can seriously affect this area and
even reach the sea, where a tsunami could occur and hit the
city.
In terms of disaster awareness and preparedness, it is
observed that the level of disaster education in Limbe is
very low. A survey carried out in the multi-hazards,
disaster-prone areas of Limbe in 2010 (UNU-EHS and
UFS-DiMTEC 2010) revealed that very little had been
done to prepare the people for any impending disasters and
to warn them to evacuate the areas before imminent
disasters strike. Two years after, our sampling of the situ-
ation as indicated above reveal an even more alarming
level of ignorance and unpreparedness. Limbe has no
meteorological station to monitor and communicate rain-
fall, wind speed, and sea level to the people. The city
remains highly vulnerable to disasters, as very few people
have moved out of the disaster-prone areas of the city
especially Mabeta, Motowo, Limbe Camp, Down Beach,
and Church Street in the southern part of the city. The
evacuation of these persons can only be achieved by a
sincere government effort beginning with the local inhab-
itants being sensitized on dangers of living in such places.
This can be achieved through local and international
cooperation and partnerships.
The government of Cameroon must empower local
communities and authorities to manage and reduce disaster
risk through appropriate legislation; by providing access to
the necessary information and resources; and through the
employment of professionally trained man-power to
effectively implement DRR policies. These basic tenets of
DRR have yet to be realized in Cameroon as a whole and
Limbe in particular. In a city with over 85 % of the pop-
ulation affected by poverty, it is almost an impossibility to
talk of the average inhabitant of the disaster-prone quarters
buying a piece of land in a designated disaster-free area
like Bonadikombo and constructing an average house of
two bedrooms. Land speculation raised the cost of land to
USD 7,000 for a 240 m2 plot and USD 10,000 for a 400 m2
plot (Awum et al. 2001). The cost of over USD 20 for 1 m2
of land is very high for the urban poor. The local munic-
ipality therefore must make available low cost housing
facilities in disaster-free areas as a measure of risk
reduction.
The poor road network and the absence of proper
drainage facilities account for the poor harmony in rain
water collection and the high level of flooding that the city
registers in the rainy season. The municipality must make
efforts towards infrastructural provision especially with
regards to roads, gutters, and drains in Mabeta, New Town,
Motowo, and Church Street and implement clean up
campaigns to ensure that these structures are cleaned up
and maintained on a regular basis. The indiscriminate
building of houses in violation of town planning rules and
regulations must be checked. Those built too close to the
Jenguele River must be demolished and no more houses
should be built along floodplains or hillslopes with land-
slide histories, especially on the Mabeta hills. Neither
should any other type of landed property be located in
disaster-prone areas. The invasion and occupation of
vacant risky sites should be stopped; streams such as the
Jenguele should be maintained and their channels kept
wide enough to facilitate the quick evacuation of run-off
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waters through monthly clean-up campaigns. Projects for
the upgrading of occupied floodplains and corresponding
resettlement schemes should be prepared. Those that were
started in 2001 in Bonadikombo should be completed and
resettlement carried out there.
Measures should be taken to increase the vegetation
cover in the city, especially around steep hillslopes to help
reduce the speed of run-off water after rainfalls. Deep-
rooted trees should be planted on steep slopes and hillsides.
The deforestation of slopes and steep hills around Limbe
should be checked. There should be awareness and sensi-
tization campaigns in Limbe, advising people on the neg-
ative consequences of dumping waste in drains as this
eventually blocks their flow paths. The seashore must be
reinforced with solid stones or block walls to avoid tidal
overflow, and the removal of coastal mangroves should be
regulated and checked. If the tides had been high on 26 and
27 June 2001, Limbe could have suffered more deaths.
Government should set up permanent local emergency
relief teams that can be activated in the event of an
impending disaster. The municipality should also set up its
own disaster management unit or service and equip it with
the necessary human and material resources aimed at DRR.
At the national level, a strong political will is needed in
Cameroon to gradually move from disaster response to
disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness. The
DDES, as the nodal disaster management agency, must
have full-time paid staff who are experts in disaster man-
agement at national, provincial, as well as local levels.
Their department must be linked to the research institutions
of the Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research and
Innovation, which would enable the disaster management
structures to benefit from advice in land use, planning, and
mapping of high-risk areas. A permanent disaster man-
agement structure should be put in place independent of
other branches of the DDES, with regional as well as local
organs each with a certain degree of operational autonomy.
The structure must incorporate specific roles for each level
of the disaster management structure, local administrative
authorities, economic operators, and the public so that all
can be held accountable for action or inaction.
When such structures are established, their sources of
financing must be clearly defined and budgeting must lay
emphases on DRR activities such as research, education,
training, and public sensitization/awareness creation. The
role of the Ministry of Finance and the Budget (though it is
a member of the National Council for Civil Protection)
must be evident in the legislations in ensuring that crucial
financial resources are budgeted by all the ministries
involved in disaster management. The keeping of historical
records with the DDES relating to disaster risks is poor,
and the information on disasters is often incomplete,
especially in terms of statistics. This is a major problem
that hampers research in this domain. The DDES and all
agencies involved in disaster management in the country
must also provide for a documentation and archives unit to
meet the demand for the collection of systematic and
accurate records.
7 Conclusion
The study aimed at assessing the Cameroon government’s
policies and practices on disaster management, especially
in the context of the 2001 Limbe floods and landslides. The
study revealed that although these disasters are a yearly
phenomenon in the city of Limbe, regularly taking a heavy
toll on human life, infrastructure, and material and financial
resources, the government continues to rely on post-
disaster relief and response policies and practices that were
put in place after the 1986 Lake Nyos gas disaster. Other
subsequent disasters have occurred in the country, notably
the explosion of gas and petrol tanks in Nsam (1996), the
Lagdo dam failure (1998), the eruption of Mt. Cameroon in
Buea (1999), the landslides at Bafaka Balue (1997) and
Lebialem (2009), the Ndop and Logone floods (2012), and
a number of recorded epidemics, and bush and market fires
(Ayanji 2004). Despite these numerous disasters and the
heavy financial burdens they have been for the government,
the state has not so far recognized the need to reform the
national disaster management system.
The study concludes that the reform of the disaster
management system in Cameroon is a matter of urgency
and the application of the Hyogo Framework for Action
five priority areas should now be seen as an urgent priority
before the next calamity takes its toll on the people and
their assets. Current climate change and the increase in
extreme weather events should act as an impetus for the
national government to put the disaster management
function in Cameroon in line with international best prac-
tices. For example, South Africa adopted a national policy
and framework for disaster management that emphasizes
DRR without neglecting efficient and effective response
(Government of South Africa 2002, 2005). Cameroon
could follow the same example with basic adjustments to
suit local needs. The state must ensure that DRR is prior-
itized and that strong institutional bases are created for its
implementation at the national, provincial, and local levels.
Structures must be put in place all over the country to
identify, assess, monitor, and respond to disaster risks. This
would enhance early warning and preventive actions. The
use of knowledge, innovation, and education to build a
culture of safety and resilience at all levels (UNISDR
2005) must be guaranteed through seminars, workshops,
door-to-door as well as radio and television sensitization.
Most importantly, where possible, the underlying risk
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factors must be reduced through resettlement, sustainable
livelihoods, and effective environmental management.
Disaster preparedness must be strengthened for effective
response at all levels. The government’s role as a policy
developer, implementer, and evaluator is urgently needed.
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